A model of learning, adaptation and innovation is used to simulate the evolution of Moore machines (executing strategies), in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game. In contrast to previous simulations that assumed perfect informational and implementation accuracy, the agents' machines are prone to two types of errors: (a) action-implementation errors, and (b) perception errors. The impact of bounded rationality on the agents' machines is examined under different error-levels. The computations indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality is sufficient to alter the evolutionary structure of the agents' machines. In particular, the evolution of cooperative machines becomes less likely as the likelihood of errors increases.
The emergence of cooperative strategies in the works of Axelrod can be attributed to implausible agents whose probability of cooperating is either 0 or 1. On the other hand, in this formulation, agents are not perfect. Thus, bounded rationality is introduced in the form of random noise (errors). Our intention in this paper is therefore, to simulate an evolving error-prone population that plays the infinitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm. In this context, the agents' strategies are implemented by Moore machines (Moore 1956 ). 5 To investigate the structure of the machines, several computational experiments (incorporating different error-levels)
are conducted. The computations aim to shed light to the underlying operating mechanisms of the machines and the generation-to-generation transitions.
The evolution of the machines is carried out via a genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms are evolutionary search algorithms that manipulate important schemata based on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics. Thus, genetic algorithms have the capacity to model strategic choices using notions of adaptation, learning and innovation explicitly. According to the thought experiment, each adaptive agent within the population is to submit a machine that specifies the actions contingent upon the opponent's reported actions. The agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game against each other and against their twin in a round-robin structure. The period-to-period encounters occur with a continuation probability of δ = 0.995.
Bounded rationality is introduced in this context, as random noise. This random noise takes the form of action-implementation errors and perception errors. Implementation errors are errors in the implementation of actions along the lines of Selten's trembling hand. Perception errors are errors in the transmission of information; an opponent's action is reported to be the opposite of what the opponent actually chose. With the completion of all round-matches, the actual scores and machines of every agent become common knowledge. Based on this information, agents update their machines for the next generation. 5 The machines reduce the strategy space to a manageable one; otherwise, had the game-theoretic formulation of a strategy been used, the strategy space would be huge.
games across different information conditions. One of the conditions dealt with imperfect transmission of information. Even though, he concluded that information conditions lead to significant differences in the evolving machines, the evolution of cooperation was not hindered drastically.
On the other hand, under the proposed framework, the incorporation of action-implementation errors and perception errors is sufficient to alter the evolutionary structure of the machines. In particular, the evolution of cooperative machines becomes less likely as the likelihood of errors becomes more likely. In addition, the prevailing (surviving) machines tend to be less complex as the likelihood of errors increases, where complexity is measured by the average number of accessible states. Furthermore, the computational experiments indicate that machines in the noisy environments tend to converge faster to a prevailing structure than in the errorfree environment. Nevertheless, the prevailing structures in all conditions tend to exhibit low cooperation-reciprocity and low tolerance to defections. In addition, the prevailing structures contain more defecting than cooperating states, with the understanding that the cooperating states are meant to establish some consistent mutual cooperation, whereas the defecting states are meant as punishment-counters in case of non-conformity to the cooperative outcome by the opponent. Finally, in the presence of (as low as) 4% likelihood of errors, open-loop machines (independent of the history of play) emerge endogenously. The latter, cooperate for one period and defect for the next four periods without paying any consideration to the game-plan of the opponent.
This study aims to elicit a comprehensive understanding of the underlying patterns of reasoning of agent-based behaviors that emerge in complex adaptive social systems. Understanding the behavior of interacting, thoughtful (but perhaps not brilliant) agents, is one of the great challenges of science. Much of neoclassical economics rests on the foundations of optimization theory. In optimization, the agents are assumed to behave rationally with full ability to select the most-preferred behavior. Yet, the latter is rarely justified as an empirically realistic assumption. Rather, it is usually defended on methodological grounds as the appropriate theoretical framework to analyze behavior. Over the years, this critique has taken many forms which include information processing limitations in computing the optima from known preference or utility information, unreliable probability information about complex environmental contingencies, and the absence of a well-defined set of alternatives or consequences, especially in an evolving world that may produce situations that never before existed. On the contrary, we believe that the incorporation of bounded rationality in the proposed context is a viable alternative; one that broadens our horizon to encompass a much wider range of phenomena in economic and social systems.
In Section 2, the concept of a Moore machine as the carrier of an adaptive agent's strategy is presented. In Section 3, a treatment based on Markov chains is analyzed. In Section 4, our choice of the genetic algorithm as the appropriate way to model the strategic choices of agents is justified. In Section 5, we provide the methodology and in Section 6, we focus on the results of the process while elaborating on the structure of the evolutionary machines. In Section 7, the structures that prevail in the various fictional environments are sketched. Finally, in the Conclusion we offer direction for future research.
Finite Automata
A finite automaton is a mathematical model of a system with discrete inputs and outputs. The system can be in any one of a finite number of internal configurations or "states". The state of the system summarizes the information concerning past inputs that is needed to determine the behavior of the system on subsequent inputs. The specific type of finite automaton used here is a Moore machine (Moore 1956 ). Moore machines are considered a reasonable tool to formalize an agent's behavior in a supergame (Rubenstein 1986). A Moore machine for an adaptive agent i in an infinitely-repeated game of G = (I,{A i } i∈I , {g i } i∈I ), 6 is a four-tuple (Q i ,
where Q i is a finite set of internal states, of which q i 0 is specified to be the initial state,
is an output function that assigns an action to every state, and τ i :
is the transition function that assigns a state to every two-tuple of state and other agent's action.
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Alternatively, a researcher could use the game-theoretic formulation of a strategy. A quick calculation however, of all possible strategies indicates that such a task is very complex and cumbersome. The set of possible game-theoretic strategies increases in size exponentially with 6 I is the set of players, A i is the set of i's actions, and g i : A → is the real-valued utility function of i. 7 For an introduction on Moore machines, refer to the Appendix. the number of periods in the repeated game (2 2T −1 where T ≥ 1 is the number of periods in the supergame).
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Bounded rationality is introduced in this context, in the form of random errors. Thus, the strategies executed by Moore machines are not error-free. We consider errors in the implementation of actions and errors in the perception of actions. That is, an error level of α% indicates that α% of the time, the course of action dictated by that particular state of the machine will be altered. A cooperation dictated by the current state, α% of the time will be implemented erroneously as a defection and vice versa. On the other hand, an error level of β% indicates that β% of the time an opponent's action is reported to be the opposite of what the opponent actually chose, while the remainder of the time the action is perfectly transmitted.
Implementation and perception errors when considered in isolation lead to quite different results. For instance, the strategy Contrite-Tit-For-Tat is proof against errors in implementation but not against errors in perception. This strategy acts in principle as Tit-For-Tat, but enters a "contrite" state if erroneously implements a defection rather than a cooperation.
Consequently, the machine accepts the opponent's retaliation and cooperates for the next two periods but leaves the contrite state soon after. On the other hand, if the strategy Contrite-TitFor-Tat mistakenly perceives that the opponent defected, will respond with a defection without switching to the contrite state, and will not meekly accept any subsequent retaliation.
The implementation and perception errors are examined under different computational experiments. In the first set of experiments, the noise level (the probability of occurrence of implementation and perception errors) is kept constant throughout the duration of the evolution at 4%, 2%, 1% and 0.5%, respectively. In the second set of experiments, the errors are affected by an on-off switch. When the switch is on, then the machines are subjected to a constant error-level of 4% whereas when the switch is off, the machines have perfect informational accuracy. In the last set of experiments, the case where the machines are error-free is contrasted to the case where the error-level is assumed to decay exponentially over time.
In order to keep pace with the notion of bounded rationality, the machines will hold a maximum of eight states. The choice of eight internal states, is an arbitrary though a considered decision. The machines will thus contain enough potential states so that a large variety of machines can emerge while at the same time, keeping the upper bound reasonable given complexity considerations. As Rubinstein indicates, agents seek to device behavioral patterns which do not need to be constantly reassessed, and which economize on the number of states needed to operate effectively in a given strategic environment. A more complex plan of action is more likely to break down, is more difficult to learn, and may require more time to be executed (1986).
Initial Results
To facilitate a better understanding of the impact of bounded rationality, the outcome of a finite but infinitely-evolving population, inhabited by a single type of a stochastic machine is analytically tracked. The analysis is restricted to two cases. In the first case, the population is composed of Tit-For-Tat machines, and in the second case the population is composed of Always-Defect machines.
The Prisoner's Dilemma payoff-matrix used, is provided in Table 1 . At the end of each period, one of four outcomes is realized. The transition rules can be labeled by quadruples Now suppose that the machines are subjected to implementation and perception errors. In this case, with probability an action will be altered in the case of implementation errors, and with probability δ, player i will misperceive player −i's action, in the case of perception errors.
More generally, let a stochastic machine have transition rules p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) where p i is any number between 0 and 1 denoting the probability of cooperating after the corresponding outcome of the previous period. The space of all such rules is the four-dimensional unit cube; the corners are just the transition rules S i . A rule p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) that is matched against a rule q = (q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 ) yields a Markov process where the transitions between the four possible states 9 are given by the matrix
If p and q are in the interior of the strategy cube, then all entries of this stochastic matrix are strictly positive; hence there exists a unique stationary distribution π = (π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , π 4 ) such that p (n)
i , the probability to be in state i in the n th period, converges to π i for n → ∞ (i = 1, 2, 3, 4). It follows that the payoff for a player i using p against a player −i using q is given by
Notice that the π i and also the payoff are independent of the initial condition, i.e. of the actions of the players in the first period. For any error level , δ > 0, the payoff obtained by a machine using a transition rule S i against a machine with transition rule S −i can be computed via (1). 10 The transition rules of Tit-For-Tat and Always-Defect in the presence of errors are shown in Table 2 . Assuming that implementation errors and perception errors are each kept constant at 4%, the invariant distributions of Tit-For-Tat and Always-Defect yield 2.25 and 1.12 utils respectively. 9 To keep pace with the conventional notation in Markov chains, the word "outcome" is replaced with the word "state". 10 The limit value of the payoff for → 0 and δ → 0 can not be computed, as the transition matrix is no longer irreducible. Therefore the stationary distribution π is no longer uniquely defined.
The first entry corresponds to the probability of cooperating after a period where both agents cooperated. Agent i will cooperate if he neither commits an implementation error (which occurs with probability 1 − ) nor a perception error (which occurs with probability 1 − δ), or if he commits both a perception error and an implementation error. Therefore, the probability of cooperating after a period where both agents cooperated is 1 − δ − (1 − 2δ).
Analogous arguments hold for the other entries.
Always-Defect (S
The fourth entry corresponds to the probability of cooperating after a period where both agents defected. Agent i will defect unless he commits an implementation error (which occurs with probability ). Notice that errors in perception have no effect here, as the strategy Always-Defect does not depend on agent −i's actions. Therefore, the probability of cooperating after a period where both agents defected is . Analogous arguments hold for the other entries. The search for an appropriate way to model strategic choices of agents has been a central topic in the study of game theory. While a variety of approaches have been used, few of them have explicitly used notions of bounded rationality, adaptation, innovation and learning. Genetic algorithms are evolutionary search algorithms based on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics. These algorithms were developed by Holland (1975) for optimization problems in difficult domains. Difficult domains are those with both enormous search spaces and objective functions with many local optima, discontinuities, noise and high dimensionality.
The algorithms combine survival of the fittest with a structured yet randomized information exchange that emulates some of the innovative flair of human search.
Genetic algorithms require the natural parameter set of the optimization problem to be coded as a finite-length string over some finite alphabet. As a result the algorithms are largely The mechanics of reproduction and selection are surprisingly simple, involving random number generation, string copies and some string-selection. Nonetheless, the combined emphasis of reproduction and the structured, though randomized, selection give genetic algorithms much of their power. On the other hand, mutation is an insurance policy against premature loss of important notions. Even though reproduction and selection effectively search and recombine extant notions, occasionally they may become overzealous and loose some potentially useful material. In artificial systems, mutation protects against such an irrecoverable loss. Consequently, these operators bias the system towards certain building blocks that are consistently associated with above-average performance.
Darwinian mechanics are a continuation of the approach that agents are neither fully rational nor knowledgeable enough to correctly anticipate the other agents' strategies. In particular, the process describes how agents adjust their plans of action over time as they learn from experience about the other agents' strategies. Yet, the dynamics also reflect the limited ability of the agents to receive, decode and act upon the information they get in the course of the evolution.
With the completion of all round-matches, not all agents need to react instantaneously to the environment. The idea is that, the observations of the agents are imperfect since their knowledge on how payoffs depend on strategy-choices is tenuous. Thus, changing one's strategy can potentially, be costly. In addition, agents are part of a system. Agents learn what constitutes a good strategy by observing what has worked well for other people. Hence, agents tend to emulate or imitate others' strategies that proved successful. In turn, to the extend that there is substantial inertia present, only a small fraction of agents are changing their strategies simultaneously. In this case, those who do change their strategies are justified in making moderate changes: after all, they know that only a small segment of the population changes its behavior at any given point in time and hence, strategies that remain effective today are likely to remain effective for some time in the future. It is for these reasons, that the use of a genetic algorithm is an appropriate model of adaptive learning behavior and innovation.
Genetic algorithms require the natural parameter set of the optimization problem to be coded as a finite-length string over some finite alphabet. In this case, the choice for an alphabet is a combination of the decimal system and the binary system. Thus, each Moore machine is represented by a string of 25 elements. The first element provides the starting state of the machine. Eight three-element packets are then arrayed on the string. Each packet represents an internal state of the machine. In natural terminology, the strings represent chromosomes, whereas the internal states represent genes which may take on some number of values called alleles. The first bit within an internal state describes the action whenever the machine is in that state (1 := cooperate, 0 := def ect), the next element gives the transition state if the opponent is observed to cooperate, and the final element gives the transition state if a defection is observed.
Given that each string can utilize up to eight states, the scheme allows the definition of any
Moore machine of eight states or less.
For example, take the machine that implements Tit-For-Tat in Figure 1 . The machine only needs to remember the opponent's last action hence requires a memory of only two states; the last six states are redundant as illustrated in the coding. 11 Given this layout, there are 2 59 possible structures. Yet, the total number of unique strategies is much less since some of the machines are isomorphic. For example every two-state machine such as Tit-For-Tat, can be renamed in any of (P The genetic algorithm thus operates with a population of machines. Each machine represents an agent's strategy. Initially a population of thirty machines is chosen at random.
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Then, each machine is tested against the environment (which is composed of the other machines and its twin). The encounters occur with a continuation probability of δ = 0.995 for an expected 200 periods per match. Each machine, thus aggregates a raw score based on the payoffs illustrated in Table 1 . These scores are normalized according to the function,
where x i is the machine's raw score,x is the sample mean, s is the sample standard deviation and the parameter α is chosen to be 2. Any normalized score that is negative is truncated to zero. The choice of α implies that the machines which do worse than two standard deviations from the mean are not allowed to be selected in the next generation. The adjusted normalized scores are thus re-normalized to determine the probabilities of selection. Given the re-normalized scores, a new generation of machines is chosen by allowing the top twenty performers to go directly into the next generation.
Ten new structures are then created via a process of selection and mutation. The process requires the draw of ten pairs of machines from the old population (with the probabilities biased by their re-normalized scores) and the selection of the better performer from each pair.
On the other hand, mutation occurs when an element at a random location on the selected string changes values. Each element on the string is subjected to a 4% independent chance of mutation which implies an expectation of 1 element-mutation per string. 13 The population is iterated for 500 generations.
The site random.org was used to generate the random numbers used in the process. 13 The effect of mutation obviously depends on the exact location on the string. The impact of mutation ranges from a simple change in the starting state (even this could have a large impact, if previously inaccessible states become active) to a more radical recombination of states.
14 The code was ran in Fortran.
In order to investigate the impact of errors on the agents' machines, several computational experiments are conducted. In the first set of computational experiments, the machines are subjected to a constant independent chance of implementation and perception errors of 4% (4%N ), 2% (2%N ), 1% (1%N ) and 0.5% (0.5%N ), respectively. In the second set, the errors are affected by an on-off switch. When the switch is on, the machines are subjected to a 4% independent chance of implementation and perception errors, whereas when the switch is off the machines have perfect informational accuracy. More specifically, in the N F N computational condition, the agents' machines are subjected to a 4% independent chance of implementation and perception errors for the first 250 generations but are perfectly transmitted and implemented for the last 250 generations. On the other hand in the F N N condition, the machines are subjected to the 4% independent chance of implementation and perception errors for the last 250 generations, whereas in the first 250 generations the machines are error-free. Finally in the last set of computational experiments, the machines are subjected to a φe −ψg exponential decay (DN ) in both types of errors where φ, ψ are parameters, and g is the generation number.
The idea is that as agents become more adaptive to the environment, so does their expertise on playing the game. The DN case is contrasted to the case where the machines are error-free (0%N ) for the entire evolution.
To assess the results of the computational experiments, it is necessary to use some summary measures of machine behavior. The first summary measure is the size of the machine, which is given by its number of accessible states. A state is accessible if, given the machine's starting state, there is some possible combination of the opponent's possible actions that will result in a transition in that state. Therefore, even though all machines are defined on eight states, some of these states can never be reached. Furthermore, to facilitate a better understanding of the underlying operating mechanisms of the machines and the generation-to-generation transitions, the Hamming distance is calculated. Formally, the Hamming distance is defined as the number of positions between two strings of length n, for which the corresponding elements are different. This metric will identify how heterogeneous the population of machines is under each computational condition, and how fast the evolved population of machines converges to some common structure.
Another summary measure that sheds more light to the machine-composition, is the cooperationreciprocity and the defection-reciprocity. The cooperation-reciprocity is the proportion of accessible states that respond to an observed cooperation by the opponent with a cooperation.
On the other hand, the def ection-reciprocity is the proportion of accessible states that respond to an observed defection by the opponent with a defection. The results that follow present the averages over all thirty members of each generation and forty simulations 15 conducted for each experiment.
16 Unless otherwise noted, to establish statistical significance the paired-differences test was used at a 95% level of significance. 4%N , 2%N , 1%N and 0.5%N conditions. In the early generations, the agents tend to use machines that defect continuously. This is due to the random generation of the machines at the start of the evolution. In such an environment, the best strategy is to always defect. With the lapse of a few generations though, some machines may achieve consistent cooperation, which allows the payoffs to move higher. In the 4%N condition, the average payoff in the last generation is 1.44 utils whereas in the 2%N condition, the average payoff in the last generation is 1.95 utils. The average payoff in the 1% and 0.5% conditions in the last generation is 2.54 and 2.65 utils, respectively. The one-tailed-paired-differences test establishes that the means of the conditions are statistically different. The results indicate that the incorporation of errors may alter the evolution of cooperative machines and result in non-cooperative ones instead. A possible conclusion is that strategic simplification is advantageous in the presence of errors (if the number of accessible states is assumed to be a good measure of complexity). In the presence of errors, behavior is governed by mechanisms that restrict the flexibility to choose potential actions, or that produce a selective alertness to information that might prompt particular actions to be chosen. These mechanisms simplify behavior to less complex patterns, which are easier for an observer to recognize and predict. In the absence of errors, the behavior of perfectly informed agents responding with flexibility to every perturbation in their environment would not produce easily recognizable patterns, but rather would be extremely difficult to predict. suggest that in noisier environments, the evolutionary process will single out the structure that performs well quite early, and the generations that come after, will be composed of variants (or even clones, if mutation turns out to be innocuous) of that particular structure. On the other hand, in the low noise-level conditions, the population of machines is more heterogeneous and takes quite a bit of time to settle to a particular structure.
Evolution Of Payoffs & Automaton Characteristics
On the left-hand side of Figure 4 , the average cooperation-reciprocity per generation is shown. As errors increase, the machines tend to reduce their cooperation-reciprocity. This 17 Consider Rubic's Cube. There are over 43 trillion possible initial positions from which to unscramble the cube. Minimizing the number of moves to solve the cube would require an extremely complex pattern of adjustment from one particular scrambled position to another. Yet, if mistakes are made in trying to select a shortcut, the cube may remain unscrambled indefinitely. Consequently, cube experts have developed rigidlystructured-solving procedures that employ a small repertoire of solving patterns to unscramble the cube. These procedures follow a predetermined hierarchical sequence that is largely independent of the initial scrambled position. Once noise ceases, the machines are able to build some cooperation that gradually proliferates in the following generations, resulting to an average payoff of 2.72 utils in the last generation.
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The average number of accessible states per generation is shown on the left-hand side of the initial decline in the first six generations, the 0%N condition seems to settle around 2.8 utils. In the last generation, the average payoff of the 0%N condition is 2.85 utils.
19 In the computations, φ = 0.04 and ψ = 0.01. The choice of parameters reflect an initial 4% probability of implementation and perception errors that exponentially decays reaching some % probability by the end of the evolution for > 0. 
Prevailing Structures
The results of the previous section are indicative of the mechanics of the evolving machines.
Yet, it is imperative to also examine the prevailing structures in all fictitious environments. This way, a lot can be said about the type of machines that survive or even the type of machines that do not survive in these environments. Therefore, in what follows, the prevailing structure of each computational condition is discerned by deriving the distribution of prevailing machines over the forty simulations. To that end, Figure 11 shows the frequency distribution of each condition. Given the convergence of the population of machines by the last generation, it is unnecessary to incorporate the entire last-generation population into the distribution. Instead, the best performer from each simulation is picked, for a total frequency of forty machines for each condition. The horizontal axis of the frequency distributions in Figure 11 , provides the names of the structures which correspond to the Moore machines in Figure 12 . 
The prevailing Moore machine of each condition, is presented below. Since some conditions share identical prevailing structures, it is only appropriate to group these conditions together.
For example, the 4%N condition and the F N N condition share the same prevailing structure.
On the other hand, the 2%N condition has a prevailing structure that is different from all other conditions. The 1%N , 0.5%N and the DN conditions share the same prevailing structure, and so do the 0%N and the N F N conditions. The prevailing structure of the 2%N condition is also composed of five accessible states.
Contrary to the previous structure, this one is a closed-loop machine where the actions in any time-period depend on the history of play. The machine is similar to the one in Figure 13 with some notable transition-differences. The cooperating state has a loop on itself in case the opponent is observed to cooperate; an indication of appreciation of cooperative play. Yet, if the opponent chooses to defect, the machine will punish the opponent with at least four defections before returning to the cooperating state again. In addition, the machine incorporates a sneaky state which tries to exploit machines that enter cooperative modes earlier. non-conformity to the cooperative outcome. In addition, just like the previous structure, it contains a sneaky state that tries to exploit machines that enter a cooperative mode earlier.
The cooperation-reciprocity of this structure is 0.33 while the defection-reciprocity is 0.67. A common trait in these prevailing structures, is that they contain more defecting states than cooperating states; yet, in the last three structures there exists an inherent pursue towards establishing some consistent cooperation. In a different case, the machines will react by punishing the opponent for at least four periods before making an effort to revisit the cooperating state(s). Furthermore, the prevailing structures do not contain any terminal states. A terminal state is one that has transitions only to itself; that is, once a terminal state is reached, the machine remains in the state for the remainder of the game. Thus, machines executing strategies such as Grim-Trigger do not survive in such an evolving environment for the conditions investigated.
Conclusion
Via an explicit evolutionary process simulated by a genetic algorithm, we indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality in the form of action-implementation and perception errors in the agents' machines, is sufficient to alter the evolution of cooperative machines and result in non-cooperative ones instead. Under the first set of computational experiments, the evolved machines are highly non-cooperative when the error-levels are high, but cooperative when the error-levels are low. On the other hand, in the second and third sets of computational experiments, the machines are non-cooperative (with the exception of the 0%N ) as long as the errors persist, but once the errors decrease or cease, the machines become more cooperative.
Furthermore, the machines exhibit some interesting characteristics in the presence of errors which lead to the conclusion that the structure as well as the magnitude of the error-level in this environment, is quite important. If the number of accessible states is a good measure of complexity, then a possible conclusion from the computations, is that strategic simplification is advantageous in the presence of errors. Also, as errors persist, machines become less prone to return cooperation to an observed cooperation. On the other hand, the defection-reciprocity indicates that machines in noisy environments have low tolerance to defections. The latter observations are reflected in the low payoffs of the machines in the presence of errors. In addition, the Hamming distance indicates that the agents' machines converge faster to some prevailing structure as the likelihood of errors increases.
The prevailing structures of the computational conditions sketched in the previous section, highlight the presence of more defecting than cooperating states, with the understanding that the cooperating states are meant to establish some consistent mutual cooperation, whereas the defecting states are meant as punishment-counters imposing at least four-period defections, in case of non-conformity to the cooperative outcome by the opponent. Finally, in the presence of (as low as) 4% likelihood of errors, open-loop machines (independent of the history of play) emerge endogenously. The latter, cooperate for one period and defect for the next four periods without paying any consideration to the game-plan of the opponent.
A wide variety of potential extensions exist. In this study, it was assumed that all machines were subjected to the same level of noise, generation by generation. Instead, the level of noise could be contingent upon the number of states accessed by the particular machine. The rationale is that a machine that contains only one state (say, Always Cooperate), is less likely to commit errors than one, that is far more complex. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine whether the results are robust to the symmetry of the payoffs. One of the basic features of the conventional Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game is the requirement that the values assigned to the game are the same for both agents. Not uncommon however, are social transactions where not only is each agent's outcome dependent upon the choices of the other, but also where the resources and therefore possible rewards, of one agent exceed those of the other. A social interaction characterized by a disparity in resources and potentially larger rewards for one of the two participants would in all likelihood call into play questions of inequality. Thus, one could run two co-evolving populations with asymmetric payoffs, to see how inequality comes into play and in particular, how the asymmetry in payoffs affects cooperation under the examined error-level structures.
A finite automaton is a mathematical model of a system with discrete inputs and outputs.
The system can be in any one of a finite number of internal configurations or "states". The specific type of finite automaton used here is a Moore machine. A Moore machine 20 for an adaptive agent i in an infinitely-repeated game of G = (I,{A i } i∈I , {g i } i∈I ), 21 is a four-tuple
where Q i is a finite set of internal states, of which q i 0 is specified to be the initial state, f i : Q i → A i is an output function that assigns an action to every state, and
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In the first period, the state is q Moore machines with the exception of the output function that maps both the state and the input to an action.
However, it can be shown that the two types are equivalent hence the analysis does not preclude Mealy machines. 21 I is the set of players, A i is the set of i's actions, and g i : A → is the real-valued utility function of i. 22 Note that the transition function depends only on the present state and the other agent's action. This formalization fits the natural description of a strategy as agent i's plan of action in all possible circumstances that are consistent with agent i's plans. In contrast, the notion of a game theoretic strategy for agent i requires the specification of an action for every possible history, including those that are inconsistent with agent i's plan of action. To formulate the game theoretic strategy, the only change required would be to construct the transition function such that τ i :
Figure 17: Grim-Trigger machine
